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THE RIGHT TO VOTE OF NON-RESIDENT CITIZENS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 1981, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of the Federal Republic of Germany released a
decision' regarding the right of non-resident citizens to vote in
federal elections. The appellant, a German national residing in
Brussels and employed as a civil servant of the European Communities, challenged the validity of the federal elections of 1980
to the Bundestag. He claimed these elections were invalid because
he, as a resident abroad, and most other citizens residing abroad,
were unconstitutionally denied the franchise by section 12 (1) of
the Federal Electoral Law (Bundeswahlgesetz).2 This section excludes non-resident citizens from voting if they are not members
of four distinct groups for which the law provides an exception
in sections 12 (2) and (4).3 Under the Federal Electoral Law, an
election can be declared invalid."
The appellant alleged the unconstitutionality of section 12 of the
Federal Electoral Law, and consequently the invalidity of the
federal elections. Under Federal Electoral Law, the Bundestag may
examine the election results for irregularities.' This appellant's request for examination' was rejected because the right to challenge
elections before the Bundestag does not extend to constitutional
issues, but is limited only to faults in the application of the Electoral Law. Only the Federal Constitutional Court can declare a
statute unconstitutional.! The subsequent appeal to that court was
unsuccessful on the merits. As it had done several times before,8
the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the Federal Electoral Law
as constitutional and dismissed the complaint. However, this time
the court added a new dimension to the problem. It concluded that
civil servants of the Community participate in various ways in the
Judgment of Oct. 7, 1981, 2 BvC 2/81, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] (W. Ger.).
Bundeswahlgesetz S 12(1), 1975, 1 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 2325 (W. Ger.)
See infra text accompanying notes 19-20.
Wahlpruefungsgesetz S 1, 1951 1 BGBI 166 (W. Ger.).
Grundesgesetz [GG] art. 41 (W. Ger.).
Bundestags Drucksache (BT Drucks.) 9/316, Annex 52, May 7, 1981 (W. Ger.).
7Id.

' 5 BVerfG 2 (W. Ger.); 36 BVerfG 139 (W. Ger.).
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formulation, development, and execution of the common legal order,
and that this participation has many implications for the legal order
of the Federal Republic.' As the Federal Republic is a member
of the European Community, the court took into account the process of integration of the members of the European Community
when considering the voting rights of non-resident citizens. Moreover, the federal legislature already has provided the right for all
German citizens living in the countries of the Communities to vote
for representatives to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. °
From this legislation, the court concluded, at least from the constitutional principle of equality, that civil servants of the Communities should be included in the group of exceptions to section
12 (1) of the Federal Electoral Law."
Thus, instead of striking the challenged statute as unconstitutional, the court suggested that the statute was of dubious constitutionality and very strongly hinted to the legislature that de
legeferenda a change in the right to vote for non-resident citizens
is compelling. The Federal Constitutional Court restricted this ruling to Germans who are civil servants of the European Community.
However, it is generally understood that such a modification of
the Electoral Law would apply to those Germans living in the countries of the Community, and perhaps to all Germans living abroad.
The legislature reacted surprisingly quickly, and on November 20,
1981, a draft bill" was introduced by the "opposition parties" in
the Bundestag Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
(CDU/CSU) amending the Federal Electoral Law to broaden the
participation of non-resident voters. It is assumed that the "coalition parties" Social Democratic Party of Germany/Free Democratic
Party (SPD/FDP) will introduce another bill that would seize the
initiative from the opposition parties.
In contrast to the Federal Republic, which is just changing its
law, the United States addressed the same problem several years
ago. Here, too, the legislature determined that the situation concerning the right to vote for non-resident citizens was unsatisfactory, especially after a court suggested existing voter protection
laws did not extend to non-resident citizens.13 Congress found that
12

BvC 2/81, BVerfG (W. Ger.).
Europawahlgesetz S 6(2), 1978 1 BGBl 709 (W. Ger.) (European Electoral Law).
2 BvC 2/81, BVerfG (W. Ger.).
Entwurf eines Sechsten Gesetzes zur Aenderung des Bundeswahlgesetzes, BT Drucks.
9/1062, Nov. 20, 1981 (W. Ger.).
10 Hardy v. Lomenzo, 349 F.Supp. 617, 620 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
10
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"Americans outside the United States possess both the necessary
interest and the requisite information to participate in the selection of Senators and Congressmen back home." 4 The fact that
United States citizens abroad do not actually reside in congressional districts was not seen as a disability because Congress
represents the common legislative interest of the entire nation,
along with the specific interests of each district."
Hence, the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 was
passed to ameliorate the situation for non-resident voters. 6 Section 3 of the Act provides that each citizen residing outside the
United States has the right to register for, and vote by, an absentee
ballot in any federal election (subject to certain requirements to
be discussed). A non-resident citizen who meets the Act's requirements can vote absentee in federal elections via his state of
former domicile. In 1978, the Act was amended' 7 with respect to
the right of states to tax citizens exercising their rights under
the 1975 Act, and with respect to several administrative matters
not germane to this discussion.
This study first separately examines the respective situations
in the Federal Republic and in the United States. After describing the present laws and focusing on the historical contexts, the
constitutionality of the laws in their constitutional settings is examined. The authors conclude by comparing various problems arising under the two legal systems and illuminating their often striking similarities.
II.

THE RIGHT TO VOTE OF NON-RESIDENT CITIZENS IN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Section 12 (1) of the Federal Electoral Law, as it is still valid
today, reads in its relevant parts: "All Germans are entitled to
vote . . .who, at the date of the election .... for at least three

1"

H.R. Rep. No. 649 pt. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS 2358 [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Report].
15 Id. at 2, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2359.
16 42 U.S.C. S 1973dd (1975). State-by-state compliance is listed in a Department of Justice
memorandum to Sen. Claiborne Pell, Apr. 4, 1977; reprinted in Overseas Absentee Voting:

Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administrationon the Overseas Citizens Voting
Rights Act of 1975, the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, and S.703, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 84, 85-88 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Hearings].
" Act of Nov. 4, 1978, Pub. L. 95-593, 92 Stat. 2535 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
S 1973dd-5 (1975)). For partial legislative history see H.R. Rep. No. 1568, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5759.

272

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 12:267

months, have had a residence within the territory of application
of the Law, or else have their habitual abode therein."'8 Section
12 (2) also grants the right to vote to soldiers, civil servants,
employees and workers in the civil service who have, on orders
of their employer, their residence or their habitual abode outside the territory of the application of the Law, as well as to the
members of their household. 9 The same exception is made in section 12(4) of the Federal Electoral Law for seamen who work on
ships that fly the German flag. 0
Thus, apart from seamen, only members of the German civil service abroad on order, such as embassy personnel, and their families,
are exempted from the requirement of having a residence in the
Federal Republic in order to be entitled to vote. The reason for
this exception is apparently that these citizens, although abroad,
still are strongly connected to the Federal Republic for which
they work, and therefore should not be denied the right to vote.21
It is foreseeable in our modern world of ever-increasing international relations, with more and more people working abroad, that
other groups of non-resident citizens would challenge the exceptions made for civil servants on the ground that they are just as
strongly connected to the Federal Republic and that they also work
in its interest, be it as a civil servant with the European Communities, as a German cultural officer or language teacher attached
to the Goethe Institutes worldwide, or as an engineer in Saudi
Arabia.22
The constitutionality of section 12 (1) of the Federal Electoral
Law was challenged in this case with respect to articles 38 (1),
3 (1), 20 (1), and 1 (1) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). It was alleged
principally that section 12 (1) violated the principle of equality
as laid down in article 3 (1)23 and article 38 (1)24 of the Constitution.
The Federal Constitutional Court long has held that article 38 (1)
and its notion of electoral equality is lex specialis to the more
general norm of article 3 (1).25 Therefore, a violation of article 38
(1) is always also a violation of article 3 (1).
18
"
20
21

Bundeswahlgesetz S 12(1), 1975 (W. Ger.).
Id. at S 12(2).
Id. at S 12(4).
2 BvC 2/81, BVerfG; Judgment of Oct. 15, 1970, 36 BVerfG 134, 143.

See Hilf, Das Wahlrechtfuer Duetsche im Ausland zum Bundestag, 1977 EuGRZ, 14, 15
[hereinafter cited as Hilf].
' GG art. 3(1) (W. Ger.) reads: "All persons shall be equal before the law."
' GG art. 38(1) (W. Ger.) reads in part: "The deputies to the German Bundestag shall
be elected in general, direct, free, equal, and secret elections."
1 1 BVerfGE 208, 242; 4 BVerfGE 31, 39; 6 BVerfGE 84, 91; 11 BVerfGE 266, 271; 12
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In similar prior cases before the Federal Constitutional Court,
the appellants maintained that article 38 (1) was violated because
no reasonable justification for a distinction between resident and
non-resident citizens existed. As the link of nationality persists
even when residing abroad, non-resident citizens still are governed
by the German Federal Government. From this it was inferred
that they also should have the right to participate in federal elections. For example, non-resident citizens are in principle subject
to military service, though they cannot be drafted while outside
the country," and are subject to limited taxation irrespective of
residence.' Moreover, the distinction made in section 12 of the
Federal Electoral Law between German civil servants and the
members of their household and other Germans abroad is also
allegedly unjustified. The work of journalists, engineers, or civil
servants of the Communities is just as much in the interest of the
Federal Republic as is the work of German civil servants abroad.
There especially is no rational distinction between the members
of the household of German civil servants and other groups of Germans living outside the country, because none have the special relationship of civil servants with the Federal Republic."
It was alleged also that section 12 (1) violated the principle of
democracy in article 20 (1)" of the Constitution. Democracy traditionally includes the notion of "no taxation without representation."3 As non-resident citizens are in principle fully subject to
taxation in the Federal Republic, if they have inland income 3 ' but
are not entitled to vote, this notion and thus article 20 (1) of the
Constitution supposedly are violated.
Finally, section 12 (1) of the Federal Electoral Law has been said
to violate article 1 (1)32 of the Constitution. For example, in the
case of death of a civil servant of the European Communities, the
state of which that civil servant is a national treats him as though he
BVerfGE 10, 25; 13 BVerfGE 1, 12; 18 BVerfGE 220, 225; 24 BVerfGE 300; 340; 34 BVerfGE
81, 98; 36 BVerfGE 139, 141.
Wehrpflichtgesetz, SS 1, 43, 1977 1 BGBl 2021, 2023, 2036 (W. Ger.).
Einkommenssteuergesetz S 1(3). 1981 1 BGB1 1249, 1250 (W. Ger.) (Income Tax Law).
Compare the allegations of the appellant in 2 BvC 2/81, BVerfG at 3.
"
GG art. 20(1) (W. Ger.) reads: "The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and
social federal state."
See appellant's argument in 2 BvC 2/81, BVerfG at 4.
", Einkommenssteuergesetz S 1(3), 1981 1 BGBI 1249, 1250 (W. Ger.) (Income Tax Law).
Section 49 of the Income Tax Law spells out the kinds of income considered to be inland
income.
" GG art. 1 (1) (W. Ger.) reads: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority."
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never left the country, and thus full estate taxes must be paid
upon the inheritance1a While still alive, the civil servant is not entitled to vote and thereby participate in the political process of
his country. Thus, the somewhat odd conclusion is reached that
this citizen is treated like an object, in such a way that the dead
citizen is worth more than the living citizen.' This allegedly is
violative of basic human dignity protected by article 1 (1) of the
Constitution.
In its opinions on the subject, the Federal Constitutional court
dealt with these arguments rather quickly. In 1956, the court decided nationality alone could not entitle someone to vote in federal
elections. 5 This is because Germany is divided, if not de jure at
least defacto, and the Bundestag only represents that part of the
German population that lives within the territory of application
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic. The other part of the
German population living in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
legally is considered still to be of German nationality. The Federal
Republic has resisted and rejected the move of the GDR toward
separate German citizenships 6 Linking the right to vote with nationality would grant citizens of the GDR participation in the
federal elections of the Federal Republic of Germany. As the right
to vote can be granted only to the part of the population living
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic, the court upheld
the decision of the legislature that the right to vote should be linked
to residency. 7 This opinion long was considered to prohibit the
Bundestag from enacting a Federal Electoral Law that entitles nonresident citizens to vote."s However, in the ruling of September
23, 1 9 7 6 ,1 rejecting the case, the court held the legislature can
make certain exceptions to the traditional requirement of residency.

' Protocol of Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities, art. 14, Apr.
8, 1965, 1965 2 BGBI 1453.
See appellant's argument in 2 BvC 2/81 BVerfG.
" 5 BVerfGE 2, 6.
' In the Federal Republic, it is still accepted legal and political doctrine, following a
decision by the Federal Constitutional Court of 1973, that the German Reich continued
to exist within the boundaries existing in 1937, although it is incapable of performing legal
acts; and that under its superstructure two German entities were established in 1949 of
which only one, the Federal Republic of Germany, is entitled to act for the whole German
nation. 36 BVerfGE 1, 16. Contra Gelberg, The Warsaw Treaty of 1970 and the Western
Boundary of Poland, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (1982).
'7
5 BVerfGE 2, 6.
38 See appellant's arguments in 2 BvC 2/81, BVerfG.
Judgment of Sept. 23, 1976, 2 BvR 733/76, BVerfGE (W. Ger.).
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In its opinion of October 20, 1973,0 the court addressed in detail
the argument based on article 38 (1) of the Constitution. Article
38 (1) prohibits the legislature from excluding particular groups
of the population from voting based upon political, economic, or
social grounds."1 This principle of general elections is derived from
the principle of equality in article 3 (1), but should be distinguished
by its formal application of the principle of equality specifically
to voting. It requires that everyone be able to exercise his right
to vote in the same formal way. But this formality in the area of
voting rights does not mean that no differentiation is permitted
at all. Limitations to the principle of general elections are possible if a compelling reason exists,42 just as discriminatory classifications sometimes are permitted under the equal protection clause
3
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.4
One of the traditional limitations is the requirement of residence
in the Federal Republic. Even section 7 of the Electoral Law of
the North German Federation" of 1867 contained this limitation.
Section 11 of the Electoral Law," which was passed pursuant to
article 22 of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic of 1919,6

also conditioned voting upon residence within the German Reich.
It is possible therefore, that article 38 (1) of the Basic Law was
drafted in 1949 with the understanding that it did not alter the
traditional residency requirement.47
The exception for German civil servants living abroad on orders
(section 12 (2) of the Federal Electoral Law) was justified by the
Federal Constitutional Court, which concluded that these persons
are very firmly connected to the Federal Republic because they
work for it. It found, without much explanation, that these persons are so different from those who live abroad for other reasons
that the Constitution does not prevent the legislature from denying the right to vote to persons living outside the Federal Republic
of their free will. 48 In language familiar to scholars of United States

constitutional law, these classes of citizens simply were deemed
40

Judgment of Oct. 20, 1973, 36 BVerfGE 139 (W. Ger.).

15 BVerfGE 165, 166, explaining the principle of general elections in GG art. 38(1)
(W. Ger.).
'2 28 BVerfGE 220, 225; 36 BVerfGE 139, 141.
'3 See infra text accompanying note 158.
" Wahlgesetz fuer den Reichstag des Norddeutschen Bundes, 1869 BGBI 145 (W. Ger.)
(Electoral Law for the Reichstag of the North German Federation).
" Wahlgesetz, 1920 RGBI 627, 629 (W. Ger.)
" Weimarer Reichsverfassung art. 22, 1919 RGBI 1383, 1388 (W. Ger.).
' 36 BVerfGE 139, 142; see also 2 BvC 2/81 BVerfG at 5.
" 36 BVerfGE 139, 143.
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not to be "similarly situated"; thus similar treatment was not required. The reason for this is that civil servants can be ordered
to go to a post abroad. By that order they could be compelled to
leave the country and lose their right to vote.
This opinion is, however, somewhat illogical. Except for the draft,
government service is voluntary. It can be argued that a citizen
consents to being transferred when seeking voluntarily public or
private employment because he serves the needs of his employer.
For all practical purposes, a private employee is under as much
pressure when his employer wants him to go abroad as a civil servant in a similar situation. Therefore, it seems that they should
be treated similarly with respect to their voting rights. Only with
regard to the draft might the discussion lead to a different result,
at least in theory. In practice, however, the Federal Republic, unlike
the United States, does not station any troops in foreign countries.
The only leave a drafted soldier might have to take from Germany
during his time of service would be for training, a short time during which he would not lose his residence at home.
Later decisions of the Federal Administrative Tribunal
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht)49 and the Federal Constitutional Court'
closely followed the above analysis of the Federal Constitutional
Court. These decisions also further developed some points. The
Federal Administrative Tribunal examined the case of civil servants of the European Community. It distinguished Community
civil servants from German civil servants abroad because Community civil servants do not live outside the Federal Republic on
orders." As such, they do not, according to the Administrative
Tribunal, have such strong connections to West Germany because
as civil servants of the Community they must serve the interests
of the Community exclusively. 2
Furthermore, although Community civil servants of German nationality in principle are subject to German taxation, they are exempted from paying national taxes on Community salaries. 3 The
court analogized Community civil servants to other Germans living abroad who are subject only to limited taxation,54 rather than
"
343
'
"

51 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG) 69 (W. Ger.), reprintedin 1976 Europarecht
(with commentary by Henkel).
2 BvC 2/81 BVerfG at 5.
51 BVerwG 69, reprinted in 1976 Europarecht at 348.
Id. at 349. See also 2 BvC 2/81 BVerfG at 7.
Protocol of Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities, art. 13(2) 1965
2 BGB1 1482 (W. Ger.).
I Einkommenssteuergesetz S 1(3) 1981 1 BGB1 1249, 1250 (W. Ger.). See also supra text
accompanying note 31.
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to German civil servants.55 This argument is not very convincing.
Two concepts have to be distinguished here, namely "representation without taxation" and "taxation without representation."
Probably everyone agrees that the latter is undesirable. The court
dealt with a case falling within the former because Community
civil servants are subject only to limited taxation; thus at first
sight the ruling seems to be conclusive. This view is, however,
disrupted when taking into account that students, the unemployed
and the aged fit into the first category, but they are not denied
the franchise. Hence, taxation or lack of taxation can hardly explain the distinction made between residents and non-residents with
respect to their voting rights.
Finally, the court rejected arguments based upon the exception
made for German seamen because this exception is justified by
article 5 (1) of the 1958 High Seas Convention. Thus, the Administrative Tribunal concluded that the failure of section 12 of
the Federal Electoral Law to secure the voting rights of Community
civil servants of West German nationality does not violate articles
38 (1) and 3 (1) of the Constitution. Also article 20 (1) and its notion
of democracy was not violated because its principles are specified
in article 38 (1) with respect to elections."
The latest ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court repeated
all of these arguments, but added, as mentioned above, that the
process of integration of the European Community suggests that
de lege ferenda the legislature also should grant the right to vote
to civil servants of the Community.
When analyzing these opinions, it is evident that the reasons
supporting section 12 of the Federal Electoral Law as constitutional are mainly historical. The thrust of the court's argument
is really that because, under the Constitution of the North German
Federation and under the Weimar Constitution, residency in Germany was a prerequisite to voting, this limitation is traditional
and therefore cannot violate the principle of general elections in
article 38 (1) of the Constitution. That is, article 38 (1) was written
with full awareness of the traditional exception and was not intended to be in derogation of it. This assumes that the content
of the principle of general elections in the Basic Law of 1949 was
the same as under the Constitution of the North German Federa51 BVerwG
Convention
U.N.T.S. 82, 84.
2 BvC 2/81
51 BVerwG

69 (W. Ger.), reprinted in 1976 Europarecht at 349.
on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5, para. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, 450
BVerfG.
69 (W. Ger.), reprinted in 1976 Europarecht at 350.
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tion and still has not undergone any changes in meaning. This
assumption is, at least, doubtful. Notions of equality can and do
change as a nation develops socially and politically.
More doubts arise when considering that under section 12 (2)
of the Federal Electoral Law not only the German ambassador
abroad but also the nanny for his children, if a German national,
is allowed to vote. 9 It is difficult to perceive how this nanny, who
is not a federal employee, is different from, for example, an engineer
working outside the Federal Republic. Of course, some reasons support distinctions between citizens abroad, as the right to vote should
not extend to real emigrants who have lived abroad for decades.
The legislature had to make this distinction and made it in section
12 (2) of the Federal Electoral Law. However, the distinction should
be drawn more narrowly. At least with respect to citizens living
in the member states of the Community, the dividing line should
be drawn anew to take cognizance of the process of Community
integration. The use of the rights granted under the Treaty of Rome
that directly flow to individuals should not lead to a loss of the
right to vote. 0
The Bundestag has addressed this question over the last two
decades without achieving a meaningful resolution." The legislature
appeared to have been motivated by political or tactical considerations, such as whether non-resident citizens would vote for the
CDU/CSU or for the SPD/FDP coalition, rather than by the desire
to find a just solution to the problem. However, the strong hint
of the Federal Constitutional Court that some action ought to be
taken on this issue, quickly prompting the draft bill62 in the
Bundestag, supports the theory that sometimes it takes a strong
word from the judiciary to move the legislature on a difficult
political question.
The draft bill grants the right to vote not only to German civil
servants living abroad on orders, but also to everyone living in
the European territories of the member states of the European
Community, without time limitations.' Any German citizen living
outside the Community for no longer than ten years also may vote."
" Henkel, Anmerkung zu 51 BVerwGE 69, 1976 EuR 350, 351.
' Id. at 352; Hilf, supra note 22, at 16.
6 See Protocol of the Bundestag, 4th session, 187th meeting, May 25, 1965, at 9383; see
also BT Drucks. 7/2063 and 7/2123; Protocol of the Bundestag, 7th session, 103rd meeting,
May 22, 1974, at 6880 and 6882.
", Supra note 12.
Id.

"Id.
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The reasons appended to the draft bill state that this change follows
the example of other democratic states, namely France, and as will
be examined, the United States. The democratic right to vote is
of such importance that it must prevail over possible technical problems. The limitation of the right to vote for citizens outside the
Community to ten years was believed necessary because after ten
years it is difficult to discern the connection between the citizen
and the Federal Republic. Because of the process of integration
toward a European Union, this limitation does not apply to anyone
living within the European territories of the Community. It is
assumed that the bill probably will lead in 1983, the year before
the next general elections to the Bundestag, to an appropriate
amendment of the Federal Electoral Law.
III.

THE RIGHT TO VOTE OF NON-RESIDENT
CITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

Introduction

The enactment of the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of
197565 (OCVRA), which protects the right of otherwise qualified
non-resident citizens to vote in federal elections, differed from the
process now taking place in Germany. Whereas the Federal
Republic has a modern constitution with broad suffrage provisions,
universal suffrage in the United States evolved from the Constitution of 1789 through a difficult process of constitutional amendment, congressional enactment, judicial decision, and divisive
periods of domestic violence in both the 1860's and 1960's. In 1789,
most of the former colonies allowed only white male landowners
to vote. By 1970, all citizens age 18 or older were eligible to vote
in both federal and state elections.
B.

Inadequacy of Prior Initiatives: The Need For Reform

Before 1955, Congress had addressed the voting problems of
Americans abroad only on a limited, ad hoc basis. Except for legislation establishing a method for absentee voting in presidential and
congressional elections during wartime by members of the armed
services," later extended to include members of the merchant
- 42 U.S.C. SS 1973dd, 1973dd-1, 1973dd-6 (1976).
Act of Sept. 16, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-712, 56 Stat. 753 (1942), amended by Act of Apr.
1, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136 (1944), Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136 (1944), repealed
by 70A Stat. 1, 81 (recodifying provisions in military code as 10 U.S.C. 5 1071-86), expunged by Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-861 S 25(c), 72 Stat. 1437, 1450 (1958).
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marine and members of auxiliary and welfare organizations attached to and serving the armed forces,67 the voting rights of
overseas United States citizens largely were neglected.
Only in 1968 did Congress realize that private citizens abroad
also affected the interests of the United States and were in need
of the protection already recommended by a 1955 act for four
categories of overseas citizens. 8 Therefore, Congress struck the
last two categories of the 1955 Act and replaced them with "Citizens
of the United States temporarily residing outside the territorial
limits of the United States and the District of Columbia and their
spouses and dependents residing with or accompanying them." 9
However, by 1977 twenty-six states (plus Guam and Puerto Rico)
had failed to adopt one or more of the recommended balloting procedures under section 102 of the 1955 Act. 70 More alarmingly, seventeen states (and Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) had failed to
extend absentee registration or voting to all of the persons addressed in the 1955 Act as amended.7 1 While twenty-eight states
and the District of Columbia at least partially accepted the 1955
and 1968 recommendations, 2 problems remained.
The definition of residence under the laws of each state was
confusing and obstructed re-enfranchisement of citizens residing
abroad. Additionally, some states interpreted "temporarily" to exclude otherwise eligible persons not maintaining an abode or ad67

Act of Apr. 1, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136 (1944) (repealed 1958), supra note 66.

" Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 55-296, 69 Stat. 584 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. SS 1973cc, 1973cc-1 (1976)). The four categories were: (a) Members
of the armed forces while on active service, and their spouses and dependents; (b) Members
of the merchant marine and their spouses and dependents; (c) Civilian employees of the
United States while serving outside the United States, and their dependents; and (d) Members
of religious groups or welfare agencies assisting and officially attached to the armed forces,
and their spouses and dependents. 50 U.S.C. S 1451, recodified as amended, 42 U.S.C. S
1973cc(a) (1981). The act also recommended essential balloting procedures to facilitate voting,
including federal postcard absentee registration. 50 U.S.C. S 1452, recodified as amended
42 U.S.C. S 1973cc-1 (1981).
69Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 90-343, 82 Stat. 180,
181 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973cc(a)(3) (West 1981)). For legislative
history, see 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2064. In 1978, Congress further amended the
Act, requiring the states to allow absentee registration and voting by members of the
first two categories of the 1955 Act. For partial legislative history, see H.R. Rep. No. 1568,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5759.
70 Letter from John C. Broger, Deputy Coordinator, Voting Assistance Program, U.S.
Department of Defense, to Sen. Claiborne Pell (Mar. 23, 1977), reprinted in 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 16, at 79, 80.
7 Id. at 80-81.
Voting Rights for U.S. Citizens Residing Abroad: Hearingson H.R. .211 before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on House Administration,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1975),
[hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings].
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dress in the state, or who for some other reason were not considered as having retained their state domicile."3 New York was
particularly notorious in both regards."
The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970"s also proved to
be of little comfort to overseas United States citizens. Title II of
that Act provided for absentee registration and balloting in
presidential elections. Section 202(d) reduced the maximum registration deadline to thirty days prior to a presidential election. Citizens
moving to a new state or political subdivision within thirty days
of a presidential election who were unable to register at the new
residence because of expiration of the registration deadline also
were protected. Section 202(e) permitted such citizens to vote in
person or absentee, in the place of their former residence.", In this
respect, the concept of bona fide residency7 in the state of former
residency was abridged federally.
When the Amendments were debated in the Senate, it was
argued that Title II should be interpreted as providing for the
enfranchisement of "all citizens who are temporarily living away
from their regular homes," even if working or studying abroad
in a private capacity. 8 This interpretation was never accepted. 9
Thus, while Congress went to great lengths to enfranchise
minorities and those in government service, most United States

1975 House Report, supra note 14, at 3, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2360.
Compare the facts of Hardy v. Lomenzo, 349 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315 (1970) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. S 1973aa, 1973aa-1 (1976)).
7 Id. at 317 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. S 1973aa-1(e) (1976)).
" Bona fide residence is one that amounts to a domicile. Ballentine's Law Dictionary
145 (3d ed. 1969). It must be distinguished from a durational residency requirement, which
requires bona fide residence for a particular length of time. The latter concept was abolished by Congress respecting presidential elections in the Voting Rights Acts Amendments
of 1970, supra note 74, at 316 (codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1973aa-1(c) (1976)). The concept was
virtually eliminated regarding all other elections by the Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
71 116 Cong. Rec. 6989-96 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
7'The court in Hardy v. Lomenzo, 349 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) interpreted the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970 as abolishing durational residency requirements, not bona
fide residency requirements, regarding United States citizens abroad. If this limited result
was not desired, the court added, "the remedy lies with the legislature and not in judicial
elision." Id. at 620. The same conclusion was reached on reargument after amicus intervention by Sen. Goldwater. Id. at 621. The U.S. Justice Department took a similar restrictive
view. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
to J. Eugene Marans, Esq., Counsel to the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting (Mar.
13, 1972), reprintedin Voting by U.S. Citizens Residing Abroad.-Hearings before the Senate
Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Comm. on Rules and Administrationon S.2102
and S.2384, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1973), [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hearings).
"
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citizens abroad in the private sector' were excluded from the democratic process in their country.
These citizens, including at least 750,000 otherwise eligible voters
abroad in non-governmental capacities," 1 encountered various difficulties in voting. Studies before Congress suggested that nearly
all of these private citizens in various ways were strongly discouraged or barred by the laws of the state of their last domicile from
registering and voting absentee in presidential and congressional
elections. 2 It was argued that these citizens served national interests abroad, even though in a private capacity. Furthermore,
as they were subject to federal taxation and other obligations of
United States citizenship,' Congress found that taxation and other
obligations without representation was inequitable.
Despite this continuing nexus with the United States, many
states" imposed rules requiring actual presence or maintenance
of a home or other abode in the state in order to satisfy tests of
bona fide residency. These rules also created doubts as to voting
eligibility of private citizens abroad when the citizen's date of return
was uncertain. An uncertain return date often was equated with
an intent to remain outside the state indefinitely. When combined
with the fact of extra-state residency, some states concluded that
both residence and domicile85 within the state no longer existed.
Even when laws did not exact such requirements, some states'
absentee registration and voting forms were so confusing that they
appeared to require maintenance of a home or abode in the state.86
' In 1979, 2.5 million U.S. citizens lived abroad, compared with 2.2 million in 1975 when
the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (OCVRA) was passed, and compared with the
1.7 million reported in the 1970 census. In 1979, 1.6. million private citizens resided abroad,
twice the number of private citizens abroad in 1968. In 1979, military employees, federal
civilian employees, and military and civilian dependents abroad numbered, respectively,
481,000, 405,000, and 44,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 9, 15 (1980).
"I 1975 House Report, supra note 14, at 2, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2359.
82 Id.
" 26 U.S.C.A. S 911 (West Supp. 1982) (taxation); 50 U.S.C.A. App. S 543 (West Supp.
1982) (military obligations); 28 U.S.C. S 1783 (1976) (civil subpoena).
See, e.g., Hardy v. Lomenzo, 349 F. supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Domicile classically consists of residence plus a present intention to remain indefinitely or for an unlimited time. 25 AM. JUR. 2d Domicil SS 1, 4; BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY
369 (3d ed. 1969); Pope v. Howle, 227 Ala. 154, 156, 149 So. 222, 223 (1933).
' Statement of Sen. Mathias (Feb. 25, 1975), reprinted in 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 72, at 12-13. In every state and in the District of Columbia, the typical private U.S.
citizen residing outside the U.S. could not register and vote absentee in federal elections
unless he specially declared and proved an intent to return, not only to the U.S., but to
that state. If he did not have such an intent, he could not register and vote without committing perjury. Even if such a citizen honestly could state an intent to return to the state
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Thus Congress, prompted by the inadequacy of prior federal voting
initiatives, the confusing and possibly unconsitutional maze of
restrictive state residency and balloting procedures, and by its
belief that overseas citizens possessed the requisite interests and
information for participation in federal elections, passed the
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975.87
C.

The Act Defined

Section 3 of the Act provides that a citizen residing outside the
United States is eligible to register and vote absentee in federal
elections at the location where he was last domiciled immediately
prior to his departure from the United States, if the citizen meets
all other qualifications (except minimum voting age)" for voting
in federal elections under any present law. Such a citizen may vote
even if, while residing outside the United States, he has no place
or abode or other address in his former state or district, and his
intent to return to such state or district is uncertain. 9 This protection was made subject to three limitations.
In 1978, the Act was amended. 1 The OCVRA Amendments made
of former residence, only a chance of enfranchisement existed in twenty-eight states and
the District of Columbia. These jurisdictions expressly allowed absentee registration voting
in federal elections for citizens "temporarily residing" abroad. The remaining states had
no specific provisions governing private citizens residing abroad temporarily. Eight states
allowed absentee registration but not absentee voting by non-governmental overseas voters
in federal elections. Two states specifically required non-governmental overseas citizens
to register and vote in person, allowing no absentee privilege. Every state, however, allowed
military personnel and often federal employees and dependents of both groups, to register
and vote absentee. Statement of J. Kevin Murphy, 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 79,
at 90, 91-92; Statement of Sen. Mathias (Feb. 25, 1975), reprinted in 1975 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 12, 13. (This information originated in a study by the Federal Voter
Assistance Task Force of the Defense Department, established as part of the Federal Voting
Assistance Act of 1955, supra note 68. States are listed and categorized in 1975 House
Hearings, supra note 72, at 281-83.
S 1973dd (West 1981).
8, 42 U.S.C.A.
Congress' attempt to lower the nationwide voting age through the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 was rebuffed by the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970). Subsequent to this decision, the twenty-sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified by the requisite number of states and lowered the minimum voting age
to 18 for all elections.
- 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973dd-1 (West 1981).
" Limitations: (1) the citizen must comply with all applicable qualifications and requirements respecting absentee voting and registration; (2) he cannot maintain a domicile,
register to vote, or vote in another state or election district of a state, or in any territory,
possession, of the United States; (3) he must have a valid passport or card of identity and
registration issued by the State Department, or an acceptable alternate if no passport or
card of identity exists. Id.
" Act of Nov. 4, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-593, 92 Stat. 2535 (1978).
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major technical, mechanical, and administrative changes and recommendations to insure that citizens abroad are informed properly
of their rights under the Act, and are able to receive and return
ballots by election day.2 More importantly, the amendments
3
eliminated the tax neutrality of the original act. This action was
prompted by the 1976 elections, when it was learned that many
overseas citizens were discouraged from using their newly gained
rights because of a fear of state and local taxation, even though
the citizens may have voted only for federal officers. 4 Therefore,
the 1978 Amendments re-established a tax provision, already suggested in the Senate Bill for the 1975 Act, providing that exercise
of the right to register and vote under the bill could not affect
the determination of residence or domicile for the purpose of any
federal, state, or local tax.95
D.

Constitutionality of the Voting Provisions

The constitutionality of OCVRA may be questioned on the ground
that Congress usurped the traditional state prerogative over elections and therefore acted ultra vires when it passed the Act.
1.

Analytical Framework

Proper constitutional analysis commences with a statement of
the precise power at issue. The OCVRA extends the concept of
bona fide residency to include certain cases in which actual residency no longer exists but in which a strong connection to the
federal government and to the former electoral district is believed
to exist. The OCVRA extends the same concept that every state
practiced respecting federal military and civilian employees, and
which twenty-eight states extended to citizens temporarily abroad.9
The Supreme Court sanctioned limited extension of the bona fide
residency concept respecting presidential elections in Oregon v.
Mitchell.97 The opinions in that case figure prominently in
understanding the power of Congress over the franchise.
The United States Constitution allows the "[p]eople of the several
- 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973dd-2 (West 1981).
- 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973dd-5(b) (1981).
9 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 2.
See S.95, H.R. 3211, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. S 8(b) (1975); 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2358; See also the Senate debate after House amendment, 121 CONG. REC. 41, 517-20
(1975). Although there are doubts as to the constitutionality of these provisions, this Note
examines only the extension of the bona fide residence concept.
" See supra note 86.
" 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

1982]

DEAN RUSK AWARD

285

states" to choose United States Representatives and allows the
"people thereof' (each state) to select United States Senators.98
The states were given the power to establish qualifications for
the voters selecting these officers, provided the qualifications were
those "requisite for electors in the most numerous branch of the
state legislature."" Article I, section 4 provides: "The Times, Places,
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing Senators." 101 This provision did not address qualifications. 0 1 In fact, a provision allowing
federal regulation respecting property qualification as Congress
"deems proper and expedient" was eliminated." 2 Nevertheless, at
least one Supreme Court justice read Congress' power under article
I, section 4 to be plenary, giving Congress inherent power to set
qualifications in all federal elections. 3
Respecting the Presidency, the Constitution again left much
discretion to the states. Article II, section 1 provides for election
by special electors selected in a manner directed by the state
legislatures. Congress determines a uniform date for the times of
choosing the electors and for reporting their votes.0 4 These provisions seem to give Congress only a minor role respecting presidential elections. Nevertheless, the Court has held, at least since 1934,
that Congress' power over presidential elections is not to be limited
narrowly to those express terms. 05 While admittedly presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal government,' 6
they exercise federal functions and as such, Congress can govern
" U.S. CONST., art. 1,S 2, amend. XVII. (This amendment altered the original scheme for
selection of Senators by the state legislatures, in favor of popular election. See U.S. CONST.,
art. 1, S 3).
U.S. CONST., art. 1, S 2, amend. XVII.
The exception regarding the place of choosing Senators was inserted to exempt the
seats of state government, which originally selected Senators, from the power of Congress.
II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 613 (M. Farrand ed. rev. ed. 1966)
[hereafter cited as Farrand] (Madison's Journal, Sept. 14, 1787). This provision was unnecessary after the 17th amendment, which provided for popular election of Senators. In
any event, Congress has the power to regulate the time and manner of the selection of
Senators.
101 THE FEDERALIST, No. 59, at 362, No. 60, at 371 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
102 Compare Farrand, supra note 100, at 155-56 (Report of Committee of Detail, VI) with
id. at 567 (as referred to the Committee of Style for final preparation).
1"3Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124, 134 (1970) (Black, J., announcing the judgments
of the Court in an opinion expressing his view of the cases.)
104 U.S. CONST., art. II, S 1.
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
" Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1955); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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such elections at least to the extent necessary to preserve the integrity of the elections.'017 This right inheres, if not from the nature
of the presidency itself, from the "necessary and proper" clause
of the Constitution. 018 Thus, it was said in Oregon v. Mitchell °9 that
just as Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional
elections, "it is the prerogative of Congress to oversee the conduct of presidential and vice-presidential elections and to set the
qualifications for voters for electors for those offices.""' Other opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell suggest that Congress' power over congressional and presidential elections are coextensive. The opinions
were framed to apply to "national officers"'' or to "federal elections" in the broad context of protecting the right to interstate
migration. "2 Finally, three justices suggested, at least in the context
of protecting the right to travel, that "nothing in the Constitution
prevents Congress from protecting . . .[against] disenfranchisement in any 3 federal election, whether congressional or
'
presidential." 1
The constitutional provisions quoted above have never been
changed expressly, but state discretion regarding both qualifications
and the conduct of elections has been eroded in order to expand,
promote, and protect the right to vote. This phenomenon is illustrated most dramatically by the partnership between the Congress
and the states in restricting state discretion through constitutional
amendments. 1 4 Congressional enactments promoting and enforcing rights granted by the Constitution also have limited the discretion given the states by article II, and judicial acquiescence has
sanctioned congressional alteration of some state voting qualifications."'
While the Supreme Court formally recognizes the original conBurroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8, cl.18; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
100 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
110 Id. at 124 (Black, J.).
10
10

1 Id. at 149 (Douglas, J.).
m Id. at 237 (Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ.).
at 287 (Stewart, Blackmun, JJ., and Burger, C.J.).
Ill Id
.1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protection and privileges and immunities of federal
citizenship), amend. XV (race and color), amend. XIX (gender), amend. XXIV (abolished
poll taxes respecting federal elections), amend. XXVI (age if 18 years or older).
"' Voting Rights Act of 1965, S 4(e), 42 U.S.C. S 1973 b(e) (1976) limiting literacy tests
in some states, sustained in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. SS 1973aa, -bb (1976) lowering minimum voting age in federal
elections, and abolishing state literacy tests in all elections, sustained in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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stitutional structure governing elections, ' it has expanded the
sphere of legitimate federal involvement gradually by broadly interpreting the old formulations and making new formulations instead
of overruling previous broad statements of state power. Citing with
approval in modern cases language from the turn of the century,
the Court has stated that "the privilege to vote in a State is within
the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State
may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided,
of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the federal Constitution.". 7 Sixty years later the Court cited
this language to support invalidation of an oppressive Texas
residency requirement under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. Thus, there was no question of the historic function of the states in establishing nondiscriminatory qualifications for the exercise of the franchise."8 The
constitutional amendments restricting state power over the
franchise" 9 could be applied with vigor. The Court demonstrated
a willingness to read the fourteenth amendment as a restriction
on state powers over the franchise, allowing the amorphous concepts of "equal protection" and "privileges and immunities" to be
used to expand federal power over the franchise. 20 By 1972, the
Court clearly was requiring state restrictions, including durational
residency requirements, to be tailored carefully in order to promote a "compelling state interest."'' With this background in mind,
constitutional bases supporting the voting provisions of the OCVRA
now will be examined.
2.

Protecting the Privileges and Immunities

a.

The Right to Vote in Federal Elections

Notwithstanding the vesting of the power to prescribe voting
qualifications in the states, for almost a century the Supreme Court
has made it clear that conceptually the right to vote for federal
.. See Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884).
'17Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) (upholding a state residency requirement),
quoted in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1964).
"' Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
119 Id.

" See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627-30 (1969); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966); Lassiter v. Northhampton County
Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959) (upholding a state literacy test).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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officers is derived from the Constitution, 22' and is secured directly
to citizens by the Constitution. This includes the right to vote for
presidential electors.'" Because of its fundamental importance, implicit in democracy,' 4 the right to vote for national officers is one
of the few privileges and immunities of national citizenship
recognized' 2 ' since the Court virtually eliminated that doctrine in
the Slaughter-Housecases.'26 Congress can protect by appropriate
legislation the rights and privileges of federal citizenship under
both the "necessary and proper" clause' 7 and the enforcement
clause, section 5, of the fourteenth amendment.'28 The propriety
of such legislation must be governed by the standards of McCulloch
v. Maryland." This Note now considers whether the OCVRA can
be upheld as a means of promoting and protecting the right to
travel by prohibiting states from forcing a choice between two fundamental rights: travel and voting in federal elections.
b.

The Right to Travel

The provisions of the OCVRA that extend the concept of bona
fide residency to include certain types of former actual residency
may be supported as reasonable Congressional protection of the
right to travel. This analysis examines the opinions in Oregon v.
Mitchell that upheld a limited extension of the bona fide residency concept by sanctioning the notion of "bona fide voting residency." Whether such analysis also can embrace the plight of
overseas United States citizens is examined subsequently.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, eight Justices of the Supreme Court upheld
section 202 of the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970.130 In
that opinion, at least three Justices gave substantial attention to
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884).
,, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1941) (and cases cited therein).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). The right to vote for federal officers
is the "fundamental political right because preservative of all rights." Id.
" Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 149 (1970) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.); Twining
v. N.J., 221 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Ex Parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884).
112 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650, 651 (1966); United States v. Texas, 252 F.
Supp. 234 (1966), affd, 384 U.S. 155 (1966); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875).
"'
U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8, cl. 18.
'" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional ....
Id. at 421.
'a' 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
11
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the issue of congressional power to regulate federal elections by
the "change of residency provision."'3 1 Justice Stewart, writing
for himself, Justice Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger, framed
the issue as "whether, despite intentional withholding from the
Federal Government of a general authority to establish qualifications to vote in either congressional or presidential elections, there
exists congressional power to do so when Congress acts with the
objective of protecting a citizen's privilege to move his residence
32
from one state to another."'
The three concluded that the basic constitutional provisions
discussed above were sufficient to prevent Congress from vindicating the fundamental right of interstate travel, which is personal and virtually unconditional.' Implicit in the constitutional
discussion was consideration of both the durational residency proscription and the change of residency provision."3 These Justices
believed that the right of a citizen to exercise his constitutional
privilege to change his residence cannot be left to the states without
a reduction in the level of protection available. 35 Federal action
was required to avoid parochial undermining of the right to travel
and change residence. While states can act in concert, in the absence
of a uniform compact, the problem can be solved only by Congress.
Thus Congress can act to protect constitutional privileges that
are national in character and originate in the federal government.','
Instead of grounding this right in the enforcement clause (section
5) of the fourteenth amendment, the Justices reached this result
by sustaining the power of Congress to protect and facilitate the
exercise of privileges of United States citizenship under the
"necessary and proper clause,"'' 7 tempered by the classic requirement of McCulloch v. Maryland" that such initiatives be legitimate
in ends and rational in means.
Lest the opinion be taken as a total abrogation of the basic constitutional electoral structure, Justices Stewart and Blackmun, and
Chief Justice Burger refined their holdings. They stated that the
131

Id. There is a rather curious reading of the Court's opinion suggesting that the Court

did not mention the change of residency provision in its 186 page opinion. See 1975 House
Report, supra note 14, at 18, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2358, 2373 (minority views).
' Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 291-92 (1970).
13 Id. at 292 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) and Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
13 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970).
1" Id. at 292.
13 Id. at 286-87.
137

Id. at 286.

13

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (see also McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 129, at 421).
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permissible scope of congressional power to protect federal constitutional rights is confined to federal action against a particular
problem clearly within the purview of congressional authority.'39
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall treated the residency provisions together and concluded that whether or not Congress has
particular and express power to set qualifications for voting in
strictly federal elections, both residency sections could be sustained
under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. Both
provisions were justifiable in protecting the right of all citizens
to unhindered interstate travel and settlement, regardless of the
specific provision from which this construction flows. Such a burden
on interstate travel was not justified by a compelling state interest,
thus Congress could exercise reasonable means to eliminate it. 40
Justice Black upheld section 202 on broad constitutional grounds,
based on an extremely generous reading of article I, section 4. He
was the only Justice not to discuss the change of residence
provision. 4 Justice Douglas likewise gave abbreviated consideration to section 202, upholding it under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment as a means of protecting privileges and immunities
of national citizenship. Such privileges include the right to vote
in national elections, especially presidential elections, where "no
parochial interests of the State, county, or city are involved. '142
Thus a majority of the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the right
of Congress to protect a group of citizens with a particular problem through reasonable extension of the concept of bona fide
residency. The issue now is to determine whether principled distinctions exist between those protected under the 1970 Voting Rights
Act Amendments and those sought to be protected under the
OCVRA.
The OCVRA applies to all federal elections. Section 202 of the
1970 Act applied only to those voting in presidential and vicepresidential elections. Should the Oregon v. Mitchell holding be so
limited? Presidential and vice-presidential elections were covered
because the president and vice-president are arguably the quintessential example of national officers, as they are the only officers
elected by every voter. Congressmen and Senators likewise may
be treated as national officers. First, the broad opinions cited
above suggest that the Court perceives little distinction between
9 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 292 (1970).
Id. at 237-39.

140
"

142

Id.
Id.

at 134.
at 147-50.
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federal officers when examining federal power over the franchise."
Second, it should not be ignored that Congress represents both
local and national interests. Congress specifically concluded that
this fact supported the extension of the franchise to United States
citizens abroad.'44 Congress concluded that overseas citizens do not
have a lesser interest or stake in obtaining the franchise than do
actual residents. It is possible to have a legitimate connection
without a physical presence or a fixed date of return to a state.
The experience of the states with respect to their prior special
absentee exceptions proved this. A state can reasonably extend
its political community to embrace overseas residents without
destroying its "political community." Traditional bona fide residency
requirements have been suggested, in dicta, to meet even the compelling state interest test"5 because they may be essential to preservation of the political community. States allowing the extension
of a bona fide residence to federal military and civilian employees
acknowledge that these groups are members of the political community, despite their absence and an uncertain date and place of
return. Otherwise, the states could not extend the franchise to
these groups without diluting the vote of actual residents, in contravention of the vote dilution-equal representation cases.146
The fact that section 202 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1970 did not apply to presidential primaries while the OCVRA
does apply to presidential and congressional primaries 4. is not
a sufficient basis for distinguishing the reasoning applied to the
change of residency provisions in Oregon v. Mitchell. The federal
prerogative over elections extends to primaries, even privately
run primaries, when they are essential parts of the electoral
process.'48 It must be admitted, however, that it is quite possible
that there is much less national character respecting primaries
selecting delegates for national nominating conventions than
respecting general primaries preceding general elections. 4 9

1 See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
, S. REP. No. 94-121, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Report];
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2358.
...Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972).
"'
United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
'" 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973dd (West 1981).
...United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944).
"' In dicta, three traditionally conservative members of the Court stated that federal
power against disenfranchisement was the same with regard to both congressional and
presidential elections. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 287 (1970).
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Even a cursory reading of Oregon v. Mitchell reveals that the
opinions on the right to travel mention only the right to travel
interstate and establish a new residence. Such rights are personal,
fundamental, and almost unconditional. However, the Court has
1
extended a similar protection to international travel.w
This protection should not extend only to the jet-setting
multimillionaire or peripatetic traveller. It should extend to the
right of international travel and settlement as well as to the right
of interstate travel and settlement.'51 While the right of international travel is not as absolute as the right of interstate travel,
cases significantly restricting international travel are distinguishable as products of foreign policy and wartime restrictions. 2
Substantial national interests have been held, nevertheless, to be
insufficient when balanced against the right of international
movement. 1
The OCVRA was passed to prevent the states from forcing certain voters to choose between two fundamental rights when other
citizens were allowed to exercise both privileges. The OCVRA addressed an inequity far worse than the inequities attacked in section 202 of the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970. Those moving interstate were not denied a voice in the federal government
totally. They were denied nothing if they moved prior to the registration deadline; if they did not, they could vote in their former
district through creation of a bona fide voting residence. Even if
they could not vote immediately after a move, the abolition of durational residency requirements insured that they were able to qualify
for the next election. By contrast, without extension of the bona
fide residence concept, United States citizens abroad were deprived
permanently of a voice in the federal government, despite the fact
that they continued to be subject to the obligations of citizenship.
c.

Promoting Equal Protection of the Laws

Another constitutional basis for support of the OCVRA is that
of promoting equal protection of the laws. The legislative history
of the OCVRA indicates congressional realization that manystate
practices regarding the franchise were at least suspect under the
" Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
152 See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). But see Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S.
170 (1978) (right to international travel is less absolute than right to interstate travel; incidental burdens not in conflict with the first amendment right of association are tolerated).
15 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
151
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 4 A judicial
determination that state electoral practices violate the mandates
of equal protection is no longer a prerequisite to congressional action under the enforcement clause, section 5, of the fourteenth
amendment.' The Court's limiting view that Congress cannot prohibit a state practice as violative of fourteenth amendment rights
absent a prior judicial determination that the law violates some
portion of the fourteenth amendment was overruled sub silentio
in Katzenbach v. Morgan.5 ' Congress will not be overridden by the
Court if there is a reasonable basis for congressional belief that
the outlawed practice constitutes invidious discrimination. 5 7
In light of Katzanbach v. Morgan, it is conceivable that Congress
sought to remedy perceived equal protection violations by passing
the OCVRA. Whether this perception is correct is a question the
Court has not yet addressed. It has long been established legal
doctrine that equal protection demands that similarly situated people within a class be treated similarly, absent adequate justification for discrimination." Distinctions affecting fundamental rights
such as voting and traveling are impermissible unless justified by
a compelling state interest.'59
In analyzing the OCVRA, the requisite class is that of all state
citizens. States are the fundamental electoral unit, and the equal
protection clause applies only to persons within a state's jurisdiction. Special groups of absentee voters, such as government personnel, were considered to be within the state's jurisdiction prior
to the passage of the OCVRA. Unlike most overseas citizens, certain classes were deemed to have retained a sufficient connection
154
5

1975 House Report, supra note 14, at 3, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2358, 2360.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 5.
384 U.S. 641 (1966). Compare The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883) (section

5 of the 14th amendment permits only "corrective legislation"; a court first must have
established a section 1 violation).
157 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). The Court need only "perceive" a
reasonable basis for Congress' particular resolution of a supposed problem. Id.
" This common sense proposition results from reconciling two concepts. First, "the equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Second, every law of specific application classifies, and in order
for government to function, the Constitution does not require that things different in fact
be treated in law as though they were the same. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
Thus, a rule of reasonable classification must be the norm, except where heightened scrutiny
is given to certain bases of discrimination, or burdens on fundamental rights. See infra
note 159. See generally Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341 (1949).
'" Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634, 638 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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with the former residence to justify extension of the concept of
a bona fide residence. If this special group were not so designated,
extension of the vote to them would dilute the vote unconstitutionally of those truly eligible to vote.
The right to travel cases, when viewed in tandem with the citizenship cases, show that state and federal citizenship and the resultant right to vote cannot be destroyed by virtue of physical absence
from the state. Afroyim v. Rusk established that citizenship can
neither be deprived as punishment nor "shifted, canceled, or diluted
at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other
governmental unit."'' States cannot use the exercise of the right
to travel to sever state citizenship. Residence is important to state
citizenship only when one moves interstate. The circumstances of
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment's citizenship clause
make it clear that the goal of the provision was to insure that
residents were also state citizens. 6' A change of residence must,
implicitly, terminate citizenship in the former state, not because
the citizen is out of the state, but because residence in the new
state creates citizenship in the new state. The first sentence of
the fourteenth amendment must be interpreted to mean that
residence in a new state is tantamount to renouncing citizenship
in the former state voluntarily and swearing allegiance to the new
state. Only in this way can the incongruous result of membership
in two discrete parts of the same federal entity be avoided." 2
Finding a renunciation of citizenship is unnecessary when considering moves to foreign countries. Typically, the United States
citizen abroad does not renounce state or federal citizenship. There
is no reason for a state to attempt to deprive him of citizenship
or its privileges because the incongruity of dual citizenship does
not exist. The incongruity results from applying residency principles applicable to interstate moves to international moves. The
effect is to strip a citizen of a fundamental right.
The first clause of the fourteenth amendment speaks to the
creation of citizenship, not its termination. Only interstate moves
affect state citizenship. United States citizenship is not affected
by either an interstate or international move. As such, a state cannot use an international move as a basis for abridging the right
to vote for federal officers, a privilege of all federal citizens even
387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967).

"
1

The amendment rejected the "3/5ths compromise" of the U.S. CONST. art. I, S 2, cl.

3, and insured that native born or naturalized blacks clearly would be citizens of the U.S.
and the state in which they resided.
" Davidson, Voting Rights of Americans Abroad, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 469, 480-81 (1969).

1982]

DEAN RUSK AWARD

295

if outside the state. Similarly, an interstate move cannot alter state
citizenship absent the traveller expressly taking up a new citizenship, because there is no reason to infer a renunciation. A United
States citizen abroad is still a state citizen, subject at least partially
to that state's laws (i.e., its jurisdiction) and thus cannot be denied
equal protection of the laws.
Once it is illustrated that a class of state citizens exists,
and that distinctions are made within that class, it must be considered whether Congress could have concluded rationally that
these distinctions violated equal protection. Alternately, it can be
considered whether Congress could have found the bona fide voting
residence requirement necessary to promote interests of the fourteenth amendment, regardless of whether a technical equal protection violation existed.' 3
If extension of the franchise is merited with respect to special
groups, it likewise can and should be extended to those similarly
situated. It is difficult to perceive how federal employees can be
distinguished in terms of bona fide voting residence from private
civilian employees. There arguably is no principled distinction between government employees abroad engaged in national service
and private civilians abroad of their free will. The class of citizens
abroad cannot be distinguished on the basis of employment. As
previously noted, Congress found that United States citizens abroad
serve the interests of the United States in many ways,'" and their
daily decisions can affect the nation as greatly as those of domestic
citizens.
Also, it is difficult to understand how some of the various state
distinctions bore any serious relationship to the national service
rationale. Many private citizens abroad serve the interest of the
United States at least to the same extent as do spouses and
dependents of government personnel. In addition, the Supreme
Court specifically has said that occupation is not a permissible factor
in determining who shall vote." 5 The proper standard is the
likelihood of the existence of a bona fide connection to the United
States and to the former election district. Otherwise, the right to
vote is given as a reward for national service where no bona fide
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), allows Congress to pass laws "plainly
adapted" to furthering the aims or spirit of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, even if it is unclear whether the outlawed state practices actually offend equal protection. Id. at 652-53.
'" 1975 House Report, supra note 14, at 2,1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2358, 2359;
1975 Senate Report, supra note 144, at 2.
'" Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
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connection exists, and the power of those actually entitled to vote
is diluted.
Finally, it may be suggested that a distinction based on voluntariness exists. Perhaps the special absentee statutes protecting
limited classes were justified by a presumption that one involuntarily transferred from the state would return to that state once
given the chance. The states might require only those leaving voluntarily to prove an intent to return. Those leaving "on orders" are
presumed to possess an intent to return. However, the voluntariness distinction may assume too much. There is no compulsory
civilian or military service in the United States. Neither is one
forced to work for the federal government. An individual employed
by a multinational enterprise is as subject to the needs of his
employer as the military or civilian federal employee. The element
of volition or non-volition is complete in both cases. In the absence
of the draft or its equivalent, there is no basis for distinguishing
special absentee groups from private citizens living abroad.
Thus, it can be concluded that the Congress represents national
interests as well as local interests; that this does not differ respecting citizens abroad; and that citizens abroad have a connection with
the United States worthy of extension of the franchise. Unfortunately, states irrationally distinguished between classes of citizens
abroad who had equally valid connections to the United States and
the former state. In light of these factors, if Congress can extend
bona fide voting residence respecting presidential and vicepresidential elections, the concept likewise can be extended to congressional elections.
The bona fide voting residency provision in section 202 of the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 was limited to thirty days.
Should the Court's approval be limited only to this situation and
not be extended to the moves of longer duration covered by the
OCVRA? It is suggested that the two situations are similar enough
to merit judicial approval. The fact that a stay abroad is of indeterminate length does not preclude the existence of a bona fide
voting residence. With regard to federal elections, Congress decided
that a sufficient nexus exists, despite length of stay, as long as
one is subject to the obligations of United States citizenship. Congress simply will risk the fact that some absentee voters may no
longer have a sufficient connection with the United States. Such
citizens would be violating their oaths as bona fide voting residents
and would be subject to the fraud penalties of the OCVRA,1" just
-- 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973dd-3(c) (West 1981).
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as those who fraudulently vote absentee within the United States
are subject to criminal sanction. While violations may be difficult
to detect, and judgments difficult to enforce abroad, it was expected that the incidents of fraud would be slight. '
There is no doubt that insuring membership in the political community is a compelling state interest. Such is constitutionally required to avoid vote dilution. However, when the relevant political
community is defined, it is apparent that Congress could have concluded that actual residence is an underinclusive and insufficient
classification. United States citizens abroad are no different from
domestic citizens in terms of membership in the political community
of the federal government. Both groups are subject to the benefits
and abuses of matters subject to vote; and while federal power
may fall differently between the two groups, the same differences
occur domestically.
When measuring "bona fides," a state cannot exclude a segment
from the franchise because of some remote administrative benefit,
such as not having to administer the voting of overseas citizens
or avoiding the uncertainty of sworn statements of bona fides. ' "
When there is a compelling interest, and measuring bona fides and
excluding non-members of the political community can be said to
be one, the least restrictive alternative must be selected. The standard can be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive.ls Thus, if
procedures already exist for determining bona fides, such as the
oath systems often applied to domestic absentee voters and to
overseas citizens in the favored classifications, the discrimination
is wholly gratuitous. Without the discrimination, benefits would
be provided to those similarly situated to the favored class, not
in any way compromising the states' goals or interests. 0
Of course, "[imn every equal protection attack upon a statute
challenged as underinclusive, the State may satisfy the Constitu-

167

In 20 years under the recommendations of the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955.

see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text, not a single incident of fraud was detected.
Letter from J. Eugene Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting (June
23, 1975), reprinted in 1975 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 264, 270. The House Administration Committee found the potential of voting fraud under OCVRA to be remote
and speculative. 1975 House Report, supra note 14, at 4, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2358, 2361.
1
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
16 Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
17. Cf.Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282 (1979) ("A gender-based classification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates additional benefits only for those it has no reason
to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny.").
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tion's commands either by extending benefits to the previously
disfavored class or by denying benefits to both" classes. 1 ' Thus,
states could respond to an adjudication that state restrictions
violated equal protection by denying all absentee voting benefits
to all citizens abroad. The only recourse for such citizens would
be to argue that actual residency requirements are unconstitutional
respecting federal elections. Congress can be seen as foreclosing
both of these possibilities by acting pursuant to its powers under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to force states to extend
the concept of bona fide voting residence to embrace those similarly
situated.
While it is said that states clearly can require bona fide actual
residence as a precondition to voting, those statements can be
distinguished as dicta. 172 Furthermore, these cases deal with
establishing connections in a new state, not continuing political
ties to a former place of actual residence. Finally, it must be
remembered that definitions of residency must fall within constitutional grounds.17 A state, in pursuing its legitimate interests, cannot choose means unnecessarily burdening or restricting constitutionally protected activities such as travel and voting for national
officers. 74
Thus, Congress acted reasonably pursuant to its fourteenth
amendment, section 5 enforcement powers, as interpreted by the
Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, in enacting the OCVRA. Some suggest the Katzenbach v. Morgan interpretation of section 5 was a
short-lived phenomenon that did not survive Oregon v. Mitchell.
7 5
However, in Oregonv. Mitchell, Justices Brennan, White, Marshal1
and Douglas 76 accepted this interpretation in full. Justices Stewart
and Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger, with respect to residency
provisions, gave Congress some discretion in making substantive
decisions about what state actions are discriminatory above and
beyond judicial views of the matter.'7 7 These three Justices also
stated that the "necessary and proper" clause could be used as
easily to reach the same result.'78 Only Justice Harlan clearly re171 Id.
172

at 272.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (and cases cited therein).

'73 Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (N.Y. definition does
not offend equal protection).
17,See cases cited supra note 159.
175 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229, 278-81 (1970).
171 Id. at 135, 141-44.
177 Id.
at 286, 296.
171 Id. at 286.
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jected the Katzenbach v. Morgan formulation. 9 Justice Black limited
it to race discrimination cases.' ° It would not be fatal though, even
if the current Court adopted the Black interpretation. While
overseas United States citizens are not likely "discrete and insular
minorities," 8 ' it is not at all unreasonable to consider the restrictive state laws struck by the OCVRA as "legislation which restrict
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation.""'8 In United States v.
CaroleneProducts Co.,'83 it was intimated that such laws may be
subject to more exacting scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment, just as minorities are afforded heightened judicial solicitude.
Congress' response to the plight of overseas citizens can be sustained even under a conservative reading of Katzenbach v. Morgan."M
d.

Conclusions on the Constitutionality of OCVRA

One can conclude that Congress could act constitutionally to enfranchise overseas United States citizens. The OCVRA, like section 202 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, was "necessary and proper" legislation "plainly adapted" to secure and further
constitutional rights. The OCVRA did not abolish, but only uniformly extended the concept of bona fide residence. This concept was
sanctioned in Oregon v. Mitchell as either "necessary and proper"
to promote federal rights or within the enforcement clause of the
fourteenth amendment. As explained, there are few principled
reasons for not extending similar reasoning to the OCVRA. The
Court easily can distinguish its prior dicta and holdings that suggest that bona fide residency requirements demanding actual
residence are beyond constitutional challenge because connected
to the compelling state interest of preservation of the "political
179

Id. at 152, 204-09.

180

Id.

at 119, 126-31.

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
182 Id.
"8

183

Id.

'" This case should not be rejected as a derelict in the stream of law. It does not stand
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) on its head by allowing judicial deference
to congressional interpretation of the Constitution in contravention of Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177. Katzenbach v. Morgan is best read as a case
about institutional competence. Congress is a superior fact finder as compared to the courts.
Factual decisions usually are set aside only if patently erroneous. Congressional action
typically involves more fact finding than interpretation of the law, to the extent law and
fact are discrete entities. Viewed this way, Katzenbach v. Morgan is not inconsistent
with Marbury v. Madison or the doctrine of separation of powers.
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community.""' These cases are inapposite. They deal with establishment of a new bona fide residence in a state. They say nothing
about continuing, for limited purposes, the connection with the
former state. The proper questions are not what is required to
constitute residency in a new jurisdiction, but when residency in
a former jurisdiction completely ends, and whether that former
residency can be extended within the former state, where no one
disputes that residency once existed. Such a limited extension
allows voting in federal elections and allows those votes to count
along with those of actual residents and federal military and civilian
employees abroad.
As to the propriety of the means, Congress probably could not
have selected a more reasonable scheme. Short of a federal system
of administering elections, which would be anathema to many (and
require a constitutional amendment), Congress had no choice but
to work through the existing state electoral system, and to create
a bona fide voting residence. It was eminently reasonable to select
the state of immediate former residence for this purpose. As far
as knowledgeable voting is concerned, Congress could have concluded that the overseas voters would be most familiar with candidates and issues from the former district and aware of current
needs through contacts with family, friends, and employers. The
authorities of the former state are also most likely to have records
of the citizen's existence and be able to verify the absent resident's claim to voting status. Thus a strong case can be made for
the constitutionality of both the ends and means of the voting provision of the OCVRA.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

In both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany,
non-resident citizens were denied the right to vote in federal elections. This denial still exists in Germany and only now is being
addressed seriously by the Bundestag. The United States Congress,
after much deliberation, acted upon its own initiative and passed
the OCVRA. In contrast, in the Federal Republic, it took a ruling
from the Supreme Constitutional Court to prompt the legislature
to consider the question of non-resident citizens. Both countries
have been uncomfortable for a long time when dealing with this
neglected group of citizens. In both countries as well, various objec-

"

E.g., Dunn. v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (and cases cited therein).

1982]

DEAN RUSK AWARD

tions were raised as to the propriety of including non-resident nationals in the political process of their home states.
Of course, the Federal Republic and the United States both encountered some problems that are unique to their respective
political situations and constitutional settings. The Federal Republic,
since its inception, has been plagued by the dilemma of a divided
German nation. As explained, 8' 6 the Federal Republic considers all
citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which it does
not recognize as a sovereign state, to be German nationals in the
sense of the Basic Law. Granting the right to vote to every German national, irrespective of his residence, would have conferred the franchise in the Bundestag elections to the citizens of
the GDR. In contrast, the specific problem of the United States
can be described best by the word federalism. Congress, operating
within the very delicate balance of federal and state powers created
by the Constitution, is often susceptible to allegations of infringement of state rights.
In spite of the particular problems of each of the two legal
systems, the similarity of the constitutional questions is striking.
In both countries, the major argument against the old laws excluding non-residents from voting is based upon grounds of inequality. Both legislatures had long provided exceptions for government
personnel and their spouses and dependents.1" This exception, based
upon the distinction between a government employee residing abroad
on orders and a private citizen leaving his country voluntarily, may
have had some validity in former times, especially in Germany.
The German constitutions before 1949, when the Federal Republic
came into being, had not created a system of legally enforceable
civil rights. It is at least conceivable that a government could have
ordered civil servants, who were considered to be politically
unreliable, to go abroad in order to exclude them from voting.
However, in the United States and in modern Germany, the courts
will prevent such flagrant violations of the civil rights of government employees. Thus, the distinction between civil servants
residing abroad on orders and private citizens is no longer valid,
if it ever was.
It has been shown, however, that there are compelling reasons
under both constitutions to afford equal voting rights to nonresident citizens. In the Federal Republic, these reasons are based
See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
For the Federal Republic, see supratext accompanying notes 18-21, particularly notes
18-19. For the United States, see supra notes 86, 164-65.
'

"
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upon the principle of equality, as set forth in articles 3 (1) and 38
(1) of the Basic Law, as well as on the principle of democracy in
article 20 (1) of the Basic Law. In the United States, Congress'
authority to pass OCVRA can be upheld upon the grounds of promoting equal protection of the laws and its power to do what is
"necessary and proper" to protect the privileges and immunities
of federal citizenship.
One might be tempted to suspect that, due to their similarity, the
problems arising under both constitutional systems when attempting
to enfranchise non-resident citizens are inherent in the democratic
system. However, it is suggested here that the origin of those problems is attributed more correctly to a particular period of history
rather than the political system itself. Only in this century, and
specifically after the Second World War, have hundreds of
thousands of people moved abroad without emigrating and thereby
severing all ties to their former home countries. With the rapid
development of mass communication and transportation, the
significance of physical distance has diminished. A degree of international cooperation and interdependence has been reached that
could not be foreseen a hundred years ago. The strong interconnection of the industrialized countries, of which the European Communities are only one example, and the urge to develop other parts
of the globe, require many citizens to live and work abroad, be
it in the service of a multinational corporation or an international
agency.
These citizens do not intend to relinquish all ties with their home
countries, because they normally view their stay abroad as temporary. Legislatures should take cognizance of this development
and not cling to old laws and concepts of allegiance that do not
fit the modern realities. The United States Congress has realized
this necessity by passing OCVRA. It can only be hoped that the
Federal Republic of Germany also will succeed in granting a right
to its non-resident citizens that is demanded by the very basic foundations of representative democracy.
Robert Dilworth and Frank Montag
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